We consider a market model that consists of financial investors and producers of a commodity. Producers optionally store some production for future sale and go short on forward contracts to hedge their future commodity price uncertainty. On the other hand, speculators invest in these contracts to diversify their portfolios. The forward and the spot equilibrium commodity prices are endogenously derived as the outcome of the interaction between producers and speculators. Assuming that both are utility maximizers and that the demand shocks and the exogenously priced financial market are correlated, we provide semi-explicit expressions for the equilibrium prices and analyze their dependence on the model parameters. The model can explain why increased speculators' participation in forward commodity markets and higher correlation between the commodity and the stock market could result in higher spot prices and lower forward premia.
Introduction
Since the early 2000s, the futures and forward contracts written on commodities have been a widely popular investment asset class for many financial institutions. As indicatively reported in [15] , the value of the index-related futures' holdings in commodities grew from $15 billion in 2003 to more than $200 billion in 2008. 1 This significant inflow of funds has coincided, up to 2008, with a steep increase in the spot and futures prices of the majority of commodities, especially the ones included in popular commodity indices. The comovement of amounts invested in commodity-linked securities and the prices of the associated commodities continued even $ 1 According to a recent estimation by Barclays Capital, the total commodity-linked assets were around $325 billion at the end of June 2014 (see Barclays Investment Bank 2014 and [31] ).
during the prices' bust in 2008 and their recovery which started in 2009; see e.g. the empirical studies presented in Singleton [53] , Tang and Xiong [56] and Buyuksahin and Robe [10] . 2 Furthermore, several statistical studies have found that the correlation between commodity prices and the stock market has grown during the last years. As an example, [10] argues that the correlation of the U.S. stock market (weekly) returns and the returns of the GSCI commodity indices varies from -38% to 40% depending on the period, and stays positive and away from zero after 2009; further statistical evidence on the increased correlation are given in [56] , [53] and in Singleton and Thorp [52] . Therefore, the investment strategies of financial institutions on the stock and the commodity markets should be considered in the same optimization problem and not independently. The booms and busts of the prices of major commodities during the last decade has naturally captured the interest of the academic community. The main question addressed is whether the behavior of commodities' prices is caused by the (enhanced by the financialization) positions of speculators or by the fluctuations of fundamental economic factors (i.e. increased demand and weakend supply). 3 Even though there exist several empirical studies, the theoretical approaches that link spot and forward prices of commodities with the rest of the investment assets are scarce.
The main goal of this paper, is to establish an equilibrium model that allows to endogenously derive both the spot and the forward price of a commodity, and is flexible and general enough to include not only the randomness of the commodity demand and the commodity holders' storage option, but also risk averse agents and correlation between the stock and the commodity market. In our model, equilibrium commodity prices are formed as the outcome of the interaction between market participants, and simultaneously clear out the spot and the forward market. The forces that lead to the market equilibrium are the producers' goal to maximize their spot revenues and optimally hedge the risk of the future commodity price, and the investors' goal to achieve an optimal portfolio strategy that, besides the stock market, includes also a position in the commodity's forward contracts. The model offers new insights on how specific model inputs, such as the agents' risk aversion, the correlation of the stock and commodity market and the uncertainty of the future commodity price, influence the equilibrium prices and the related risk premia.
Model description
We consider a model of two points in time: the initial one and a given (short-term) future horizon T . We assume that the main market participants are the representative agents of the commodity's holders/suppliers and the financial investors, who shall hereafter be called producers 4 and speculators 5 respectively.
The producers' source of income are the revenues from spot and future sales. While the commodity spot price could be determined by the spot commodity demand function, the future price is subject to demand shocks. Assuming that producers are risk averse, their goal is not only to maximize their spot revenues, but also to reduce their risk exposure to the future commodity price by maximizing their expected utility. 6 If the production schedule at the initial and future time is a predetermined pair of units, producers have two decisions to make: what amount of the production to supply in the spot market (inventory management) and what position to take in the forward contract (hedging strategy). Provided they know the demand function of the commodity's consumers at the initial time, they can determine the commodity spot price by choosing the amount of the inventory they will hold up to the terminal time. However, random demand shocks at time T will shift the whole demand function to lower or higher levels (for instance, in Section 4 we suppose that the random shift of the demand function is driven by a vector of stochastic market factors). Producers hedge the risk which stems from the future time demand function by taking a short position in forward contracts written on the same commodity and with maturity equal to T . The fact that the inventory will also be sold at time T makes the forward hedging position even more important for the producers. 7 The producers' hedging demand is covered by financial investors (the speculators), who take the opposite position in the forward commodity contracts and thus share some of the future price uncertainty risk, possibly against a premium. They invest optimally in an exogenously priced stock market 8 and are willing to take the future commodity price risk in order to better diversify their portfolio. Indeed, as mentioned above, the correlation between commodity and stock market indices has been shown to be away from zero. This correlation could be incorporated in a model where the stock market price is driven by the same stochastic factors that drive the evolution of the commodity demand function. Given this correlation, the optimal investment strategy in the stock and the commodity market should be considered in the same optimization problem. As in the producers' side, we assume that the investors are represented by an agent who is a utility maximizer and whose investment choices are the (possibly dynamic) trading strategy in the stock market and the position in the forward commodity contract.
The optimization choices of both producers and speculators clearly depend on the forward commodity price. We define as equilibrium forward price the price that clears the forward marproduction schedule is a given input and the spot revenues of the producers come only from the commodity sales, thus our findings apply directly in case the refiners are the ones that distribute the commodity in the market. 5 As highlighted in [42] , it is rather difficult to identify whether the long position in the commodity forward contracts is taken by investors who just want to diversify or by speculators who invest based on specific predictions about the move of commodity prices. As a matter of fact, the holders of a long position in the forward contract can also be called insurers, since they undertake some of the producers' risk. Without attempting to enter in this debate, we follow the existing literature and call the producers' counterparties in the forward contract speculators. 6 The massive use of derivatives by natural gas and crude oil producers presented in Table 1 of [1] is a clear evidence that commodity producers are indeed risk averse regarding their future revenues. 7 The significance of the inventory policy in the spot and forward price fluctuations has been highlighted by many authors, see e.g. [29, 41, 47, 53] for detailed discussions and statistical evidence especially in the popular example of crude oil prices. 8 Here, exogenously means that investors in the commodity forward contract are price takers in the stock market.
This implies that the volume in the commodity forward contracts is not so large to influence the price of the stock market, an assumption that is supported by the corresponding market volumes.
ket and at which both participants' expected utilities are maximized. Given the forward price, the producers optimally choose the inventory policy, which in turn gives the initial commodity supply and thus determines the spot price through the initial demand function of the consumers. Therefore, by deriving the equilibrium forward commodity price, the equilibrium spot price as well as the producers' optimal inventory policy are also endogenously derived in our model.
Findings and contributions
The main result of this work is to prove, under CARA risk preferences and upon some minor technical assumptions, that equilibrium spot and forward commodity prices exist. In this proof, we use standard duality arguments to show that both producers' and speculators' optimization problems are well-defined and admit finite solutions. The existence of the forward commodity equilibrium price is first proved for every fixed producers' storage choice. Then, we show that this equilibrium is stable with respect to the storage choice, which in turn guarantees the existence of the commodity market equilibrium. In fact, this stability result is interesting in its own right, since it shows that the market clearing is stable with respect to any control variable which belongs to a closed set of real numbers. The constructive nature of the aforementioned proof allows us to derive implicit formulas for spot and forward prices, which can be used to investigate how the main model parameters influence the commodity market. We illustrate this using two examples with factors driven by Lévy processes; first a Brownian motion then a jump-diffusion process. The main results are given below.
Focusing first on the equilibrium spot price, our results imply it is monotonic with respect to the agents' risk aversion coefficient; it is increasing for producers and decreasing for speculators (see Figures 5.1 and 5.2) . When producers are more concerned about the commodity future price uncertainty, they increase their position in the forward contract and hence lock the selling price at the terminal time. As long as the hedging position is counterpartied by the speculators, high risk averse producers can increase their certain revenues today and at the same time hedge their future price risk. What is very important in this monotonicity is the correlation between the stock market and the demand random shocks. As it is illustrated in Section 5, when correlation is away from zero, the equilibrium spot price is pushed upwards. This is mainly because higher correlation means that speculators are able to better hedge their risk exposure in the commodity market by adjusting their investments in the stock market. Hence, they are willing to receive a lower forward premium, thus making hedging cheaper for the producers. In particular, when the speculators are more risk averse, they reduce their share in the future commodity price risk; thus, producers cannot hedge their future price risk which forces them to increase their supply in the spot market. Therefore, the spot price is a decreasing function of speculators' risk aversion (all else equal).
The monotonicity of the spot price with respect to risk aversions could also be used to explain how the participation of speculators in the commodity forward markets could result in an increase of spot commodity prices. Indeed, under CARA preferences the more speculators participate in the market, the higher the aggregate risk tolerance becomes or, equivalently, the lower the representative risk aversion' coefficient becomes (see, among others, Wilson [57] ). As discussed above, this implies higher spot commodity price, a result that is consistent with the observed market data (see e.g. [10] and Henderson et al. [31] ). Similarly, we verify that more producers (of the same total production) implies lower spot price.
Besides equilibrium commodity spot prices, our model allows to endogenously derive quantities that characterize the two major, and not mutually exclusive, theories of forward commodity markets: the theory of storage and the theory of normal backwardation. Based on the ideas introduced in Kaldor [38] , Working [58] and Brennan [9] , the theory of storage states that the holders of the commodity inventories get an implicit benefit, called convenience yield, which implies the value of the spot commodity consumption. This yield can be approximated by the difference between the spot and the forward price minus the cost of storage. Our equilibrium model verifies that the convenience yield is increasing with respect to the producers' risk aversion, meaning that the more sensitive about the risk the producers are, the more commodity forward units they hedge depressing the forward price (see Figure 5 .4 for the Brownian motion example). A similar increasing relation holds for the speculators (these relations, in particular, generalize the results of Proposition 1 in Acharya et al. [1] ). However, the convenience yield is not always monotonic with respect to the correlation coefficient. As discussed in Section 4, there are two effects of opposing direction on the convenience yield, one coming from the decrease of the effective speculators' risk aversion and other from the corresponding increase on the spot price. The total effect mainly depends on the level of the agents' risk aversions.
On the other hand, the theory of normal backwardation (see the seminal works by Keynes [40] and Hicks [32] ), states that there is a positive premium required by the speculators in order to satisfy the producers' hedging demand in forward contracts. This premium, usually called forward or insurance premium, is given as the percentage difference between the expected commodity price at maturity and its forward price. As expected, this premium is increasing (decreasing) with respect to speculators' (producers') risk aversion.
In contrast to the existing literature, our model includes as an input the correlation between the stock market and the commodity demand shock. As mentioned above, several empirical studies have shown that this correlation is indeed non-zero and, as our results demonstrate, it does influence the equilibrium prices heavily. In particular, as it is shown in Section 5, the effective speculators' risk aversion coefficient is decreasing in the presence of non-zero correlation. This simply reflects the fact that higher correlation means better hedging of the forward contract position by trading in the stock market (provided there are no short-selling constraints on the speculators' trading strategies). Hence, non-zero correlation has in principle the same effect on the equilibrium as a decrease in the speculators' risk aversion (see Figures 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3) . For instance, higher correlation (in absolute values) means higher spot commodity price, a result that is also consistent with the observed market data (see e.g. [56] ). A similar effect is caused by an increased variance of the demand shock, which can be due to the presence of jumps (see Figure  5 .3).
Relation with the existing literature
Equilibrium pricing models in markets that consist of utility maximizing agents have been recently addressed by a number of authors in mathematical finance; see, among others, Anthropelos and Žitković [4] , Barrieu and El Karoui [7] , Cheridito et al. [13] , Filipović and Kupper [23] and Horst et al. [35] . The results in this literature however do not cover the case of commodity forward contracts, not only because a commodity has a consumption value which is reflected by the consumers' demand function, but also due to the producers' specific storage choice. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to apply a utility maximization criterion for spot and forward equilibrium prices of commodities, while considering also the existence of a correlated stock market.
Theoretical studies of the equilibrium relationship between spot and forward commodity prices go back to Anderson and Danthine [3] , Stoll [54] and Hirshleifer [33, 34] . The results of these seminal works are limited regarding the agents' risk preferences, which are assumed to be mean-variance, while recent extensions of this setting have followed different approaches than ours. For instance in Baker [6] , mean-variance optimization problems are imposed in a discrete time dynamic model, where speculators are the ones that have the storage option and the consumers (the households) get utility from consumption and the wealth (numéraire units). In Routledge et al. [47] and Pirrong [45] , speculators are assumed to be risk neutral and without access to other financial markets, while forward prices are simply the expectations of future spot prices. The interaction between the optimal storage and the speculators' optimal position in the forward contract and its effect to spot and forward equilibrium prices are also studied in Ekeland et al. [22] . However, in contrast to our model the speculators trade only in forward contracts, while the preferences are mean-variance, which means that they are not monotonic with respect to futures revenues. More recently, endogenous commodity supply under asymmetric information and limited participation has been developed in Leclercq and Praz [44] . Static mean-variance models have been also studied and statistically tested in Acharya et al. [1] and Gorton et al. [28] , however neither the speculators nor the producers trade in any other market outside of the commodity market 9 . Hence, their theoretical results cover only a very special case of our model, namely, when the stock and the commodity market are uncorrelated and the demand random shift is normally distributed. 10 The main novelties of our approach compared to the related literature are the consideration of an exogenous stock market available in the speculators' trading set, the risk aversion of the agents' preferences and the much richer family of processes that model the market factors. 11 Indeed, as has already been discussed, both the correlation between the stock and commodity market and the jump component do influence the equilibrium prices. This paper is structured as follows: Section 2 sets up the general framework for our equilibrium model. The well-posedness of the agents' optimization problems and the existence of an equilibrium are proved in Section 3. Section 4 studies a model with continuous trading under Lévy dynamics, where semi-explicit formulas for equilibrium quantities are derived and discussed. Finally, Section 5 focuses on two examples that permit the illustration and a further economic interpretation of the results. Technical proofs of Section 5 are placed in Appendix A. 9 In [1] speculators are assumed risk neutral, but the imposed capital constraints eventually lead to a mean-variance optimization criterion, while in [28] there is a random supply shock at the terminal time, which however does not change the general idea of the equilibrium setting. 10 Continuous time dynamic models with random demand shocks and exogenously given spot prices have been developed in [8] and [12] . 11 The seminal works [54] and [33] also include a correlated risky asset in the investors' set of strategies, forming an equilibrium framework. However, our results are more general regarding not only the utility preferences and the stochasticity of the market model, but also the set of speculators' trading strategies.
A general framework for commodity prices
We start by describing a general modeling framework where the interaction of market participants determines the spot and forward prices of commodities. The model consists of a pair of representative agents 12 : the producers produce the commodity, supply part of the production at the spot market and store the rest, while they hedge their exposure to price fluctuations using forward contracts on the commodity. The speculators invest in the financial markets and, in order to diversify their portfolio, they also invest in the commodities forward market. Moreover, the model includes consumers who consume the commodity at the spot market. The goal is to determine the price of the commodity that makes the forward market clear out, assuming that both producers and speculators are utility maximizers. More specifically, the producers produce π 0 units of the commodity at the initial time 0 and π T units at the terminal time T ; both π 0 and π T are assumed to be deterministic 13 . They offer π 0 − α units at the spot market at time 0 and store the rest for time T . Furthermore, they hedge their exposure by investing in the forward market. Therefore, their position at time T is
where P 0 and P T denote the spot price at times 0 and T respectively, R the discretely compounded interest rate, ε ∈ [0, 1] the cost of storage considered as percentage of the stored units 14 , F the forward price and h p the amount of forward contracts held by the producers. A positive h p indicates a long position in the forward contract, while a negative h p amounts to a short one. The producers' utility is assumed to be exponential, henceforth their preferences are described by
2)
where γ p > 0. As in Anderson and Danthine [2, 3] , their problem is to find an optimal storage strategy α ∈ [0, π 0 ] and an optimal hedging strategy h p ∈ R that maximize the utility of their position (2.1). Therefore, their utility maximization problem is
The spot price of the commodity is the price at which the consumers' demand equals the producers' supply. The consumers' demand at the initial time is given by a strictly decreasing and linear function 15
where µ ∈ R and m ∈ R + . The parameter m is a measure of the elasticity of demand for the commodity. The demand at the terminal time is random and depends on the factors driving the commodities market, which are incorporated in a random variable X. The demand function at the terminal time is of the form
In other words, we assume that the shape and the elasticity of the demand function remain the same, however there is a random shift 16 acting on it. This shift may be, for example, the result of an increase or decrease in the prices of the competitive commodities, of fluctuations in a dominated currency, or of an exogenous increase in the demand for every price level. Since the demand function is linear, the inverse demand function is also linear and equals
Henceforth, if the producers store α units at the initial time, the spot price of the commodity, determined by the equilibrium condition between demand and supply, equals
while the commodity spot price at the terminal time is
The producers control the spot price by choosing the inventory policy. By storing more commodity units they increase the spot price, but they also increase their exposure to the variation of the future spot price since the stored units will be supplied at the next time period. The speculators take a position h s in the forward contract and invest in an exogenously 17 priced financial market. Their position at time T equals
for G ∈ G, where G is a set of random variables that models discounted trading outcomes attainable with zero initial wealth. This general formulation allows to consider different scenarios simultaneously.
Example 2.1. The simplest scenario is G = {0}, whence the investors can only invest in the forward contract. Another scenario is to consider an asset price process S and denote by G(θ) = · 0 θ u dS u the gains process for a trading strategy θ. In that case, the set of trading outcomes G is given by 16 A similar random shift has already been used in the literature, see for instance [45] . 17 In other words, the speculators are price-takers when they invest in the financial market.
for a set Θ of admissible, self-financing trading strategies. Transaction costs can be easily incorporated as well by setting
We assume that the speculators' utility is also exponential with γ s > 0, that is, their preferences are described by
therefore their utility maximization problem reads as
The maximization problem of both participants depends on the forward price F . This price is determined by the equilibrium in the forward market, which is defined below.
is called an equilibrium if it satisfies the following conditions:
• Market clearing: the forward market clears out in the sense that
(2.12)
• Optimality: the pair (α,ĥ) is optimal for the producers' problem Π p andĥ is optimal for the speculators' problem Π s .
The priceF = F (α) is called the equilibrium commodity forward price at maturity T . The induced priceP 0 := P 0 (α) derived by (2.7) is called the equilibrium commodity spot price at 0.
The utility maximization problems of both agents are equivalent to risk minimization problems relative to the entropic risk measure; see e.g. Barrieu and El Karoui [7] . The risk measure point of view is more natural for certain agents, such as a corporation managing its risk exposure.
Equilibrium in the general framework
The aim of this section is to show that an equilibrium exists in the general modeling framework described above, under mild assumptions on the random variable X and the set of trading outcomes G. Let (Ω, F, P) be a probability space where F = F T . In the sequel all equalities and inequalities between random variables are understood in the P-almost sure sense. The interior and the boundary of a set K are denoted by K • and ∂K, respectively, and the domain of a function f by domf .
We denote the set of exponential moments of X by U X = {u ∈ R : E[e uX ] < ∞} and define the cumulant generating function of X by
The following conditions will be used throughout this work:
(COE) If ∂U X = ±∞ then the following limit holds:
The next lemma summarizes some useful properties of the cumulant generating function.
Lemma 3.1. The cumulant generating function κ X is convex and lower semicontinuous.
Proof. Convexity follows directly from Hölder's inequality; for p, q ∈ (0, 1) conjugate, we have that
In order to show lower semicontinuity, consider a sequence u n → u; then e unx is a sequence of positive functions. Applying Fatou's lemma, we get
Producers' optimization problem
The first step is to consider the producers' optimization problem and show that it admits a unique maximizer under mild assumptions. The producers' position, using the spot market equilibrium conditions (2.7) and (2.8), can be written as
where q is a quadratic function in α and h p of the form
while is a bilinear function in α and h p given by
Using the translation invariance of the exponential utility function, the producers' utility takes the form
In the sequel, we will work with the extended producers' utility U p (w(α, h p )) which is defined as follows:
can then be written as follows Proof. The function U p (w(α, h p )) in (3.5) is upper semicontinuous and strictly concave in α and h p , since q is quadratic, is linear and κ X is convex and lower semicontinuous in its arguments; see Lemma 3.1 and (3.3)-(3.4). Observe that α takes values in a bounded set. If the set U X is also bounded, then the existence of a maximizer follows by the concavity and the upper semicontinuity of U p (w(a, h p )). Otherwise, if U X is unbounded, using Assumption (COE), the linearity of in α and that α belongs to a bounded set, we get that
Therefore, U p (w(α, h p )) is coercive in h p resulting in the existence of a maximizer. Finally, if (α,ĥ p ) does not belong to U X , then the utility of the producer is not maximized, see (3.6) .
Corollary 3.3. Assume that conditions (EM) and (COE) hold. Then, the function u p (α, ·) is concave and upper semicontinuous for every α ∈ [0, π 0 ]. In addition, it is coercive uniformly in α, that is
(3.10)
Speculators' optimization problem
The second step is to analyze the structure and properties of the speculators' optimization problem. Although we cannot prove the existence of a unique maximizer at this level of generality, the results we obtain are sufficient to show the existence of an equilibrium in the next subsection. Let Q be a probability measure on (Ω, F). The relative entropy H(Q|P) of Q with respect to P is defined by
Given α ∈ [0, π 0 ], the spot price of the commodity P T = P T (α) is provided by (2.8) . Define the function
for a convex set G of F T -measurable random variables that contains 0. In order to prove the existence of an equilibrium we will make use of the following assumption:
The function h s → u s (α, h s ) is also concave for every α ∈ [0, π 0 ], while the speculators' optimization problem can be expressed as follows
Throughout this section, we will also make use of the sets
The assumption of absence of arbitrage in the financial market has the following form: 
which yields (3.13) . Finally, defining F :
Existence of equilibrium
We are now ready to show that under mild assumptions an equilibrium exists in the general modeling framework described in Section 2. We start with some preparatory results from convex analysis before stating and proving the main theorem. According to (3.7), the producers' optimization problem is described by
Similarly, from (3.12) and (3.14) the investors' optimization problem is described by
In the sequel we will make use of several results from convex analysis; we refer the reader to Rockafellar [46] for a comprehensive introduction. We define the sup-convolution of u p and u s via
and we know that its conjugate function satisfies 
Then there exists an equilibrium (α,ĥ,F ).
Proof. The proof of this theorem is carried out in three steps and the strategy is represented by the following diagram:
The first step is to show that for every fixed α there exists an equilibrium. Then, we consider a sequence (α n ) maximizing the producers' utility that converges to some α. The previous step yields the existence of equilibrium prices F (α n ) = F n and F (α) corresponding to α n and α, respectively. The second step is to show that the equilibrium prices F n converge to some limit, denoted by F . The final step is to show that F equals F (α).
Step 1: Fix α ∈ [0, π 0 ]. According to Propositions 3.2 and 3.4, there exists a price F = F (α) ∈ R such that
(3.24)
Using (3.23) and conditions (EM) and (NA) we get that u p (α, ·) > −∞ and u s (α, ·) > −∞ in a neighborhood of 0. Hence u(α, ·) > −∞ on a neighborhood of 0, therefore 0 belongs to the interior of dom u(α, ·), which by [46, Theorem 23.4] implies that ∂u(α, 0) = ∅. Let F (α) be an element of the supergradient ∂u(α, 0). Then In other words, for every fixed α ∈ [0, π 0 ] there exists an equilibrium.
Step 2: Consider an optimizing sequence (α n ) for the producers' utility converging to α, then
where F n = F (α n ) is the sequence of equilibrium prices corresponding to α n . Let us now prove that both the equilibrium prices F n and the optimal strategies h n = h p (α n ) = −h s (α n ) are bounded; henceforth h n → h and F n → F by possibly passing to a subsequence. The upper semicontinuity of u p , condition (USC) and the definition of the sup-convolution yield that
which is finite by (3.24) . Moreover, due to condition (3.23) there exists a neighborhood V of 0 such that
Hence, there exist constants c 1 ∈ R and c 2 > 0 such that
it follows from Corollary 3.3 that (h n ) is also bounded.
Step 3: Finally, the goal is to identify F as the desired equilibrium price, that is, prove that F = F (α). We start by showing that
Thus, by the definition of the conjugate u *
Moreover, equilibrium prices belonging to the supergradient of u, ensures that
and thus lim inf n→∞ u * p (α n , F n ) ≥ u * p (α, F ). Hence (3.27) holds. The same argumentation implies that u * s (α n , F n ) → u * s (α, F ). Next, we show that u(α n , 0) → u(α, 0). On the one hand, there exists an h ∈ R such that
The first equality holds since the supremum is attained, the second follows from the continuity of u p and u s in α and the last one by (3.19) . On the other hand, (h n ) converging to h implies
making use of the same argumentation for each equality as above.
Summarizing, using the convergence of the sup-convolutions, (3.22) , (3.20) and the convergence of the conjugates, we arrive at 
A model with continuous trading and dependent markets
In this section, we consider a model where speculators are allowed to trade continuously over time in the financial market, while the dynamics of the financial and the commodity markets are dependent and driven by Lévy processes. The aim is to derive explicit representations for the optimization problems of the producers and the speculators. Lévy processes have been used for modeling variables in finance, such as stocks or interest rates, whose return distributions exhibit fat tails and skew because they can combine realistic features with analytical tractability; see e.g. Carr et al. [11] , Cont and Tankov [16] , Eberlein [18] and Schoutens [50] . Gorton and Rouwenhorst [27] provide evidence that commodity futures exhibit similar behavior. In this setup, we can easily combine diffusions with jump processes, while different types of dependence structures can also be incorporated. The speculators observe the evolution of the consumers' demand through time and adjust their trading strategy dynamically 18 . Moreover, the uncertainty in the evolution of the consumers' demand and the evolution of the financial market are dependent processes which can exhibit shocks (i.e. large jumps). The producers are trading in the forward market only at discrete time instances, associated with their production schedule 19 . This setting reflects real-world situations, in the sense that the arrival of certain news can affect both the demand for a certain commodity as well as the financial market, these processes are observable over time and speculators typically trade continuously in the financial market and adjust their portfolios according to new information.
Consider a complete stochastic basis (Ω, F, F, P) where F = (F t ) t∈[0,T ] denotes the filtration (flow of information). Let Z = (Z t ) t∈[0,T ] be an R d -valued Lévy process with characteristic triplet (b, c, ν), where b ∈ R d , c is a symmetric, non-negative definite d × d matrix and ν is a Lévy measure; see e.g. Applebaum [5] , Kyprianou [43] or Sato [49] for more details on Lévy processes. Denote the set of exponential moments of Z t , t ∈ [0, T ], by
This set is convex and contains the origin, cf. Sato [49, Thm. 25.17] . Assuming that 0 ∈ U • Z , exponential moments exist and the Lévy-Itô decomposition takes the form
where µ Z is the random measure of jumps of the process Z with compensator ν Z = Leb ⊗ ν.
The moment generating function of Z t is well-defined for every u ∈ U Z and we know from the Lévy-Khintchine formula that E e u,Zt = exp tκ(u) ,
where κ denotes the cumulant generating function of Z 1 , that is The uncertainty in the financial and the commodity markets is modeled using the Lévy process Z and a factor structure. More precisely, we consider vectors u 1 , u 2 ∈ R d that specify how Z influences each market. We will incorporate the financial market in a representative stock index whose discounted price process S is modeled by
(4.5) 19 The fact that dynamic trading of the commodity forward contract is not considered implies that producers counterpart the position of speculators only at the initial and the terminal time for hedging purposes. 
The producers' optimization problem revisited
The cumulant generating function of the random variable X = u 2 , Z T in this setting, using (4.3), takes the form 7) and the set of exponential moments equals U X = {v ∈ R : vu 2 ∈ U Z }. Therefore, the function u p in the producers' optimization problem (3.7)-(3.8) can be rewritten as
otherwise. 
The speculators' optimization problem revisited
The speculators in this setting can trade continuously in the asset S which incorporates the financial market according to an admissible strategy θ. In other words, the set of trading outcomes equals
where the set of admissible trading strategies is defined by The no-arbitrage condition is subsequently adjusted to the following:
The speculators' position (2.9) now takes the form (4.11) and the aim is to derive an explicit expression for their optimization problem, in particular for the function u s (α, h s ) in (3.11) . Define the measure P s via the Radon-Nikodym derivative 
Moreover, the Lévy triplet of the univariate Lévy process u i , Z , i = 1, 2, under P s is provided by The exponential transform of the process Y = u 1 , Z is denoted by Y , that is E( Y ) = e Y . The process Y is again a Lévy process and its triplet, relative to P s , is given by 
(4.16)
The next result provides the solution of the optimization problem with respect to the financial market. We will also make use of the following condition:
which solves the equation
where κ s 1 denotes the cumulant generating function of Y under P s . 
Proof. According to Fujiwara [25, Theorem 4.2] and using condition (FE), we have that 20) where P * denotes the measure minimizing the relative entropy with respect to P s . The function x → |e x − 1|e η * (e x −1) is submultiplicative and bounded by e x e η * e x on {x > 1}, thus condition (FE) in conjunction with Sato [49, Theorem 25.3] and (4.14) yield that
Applying Hubalek and Sgarra [36, Theorems 4 and 8] , we get that the minimal entropy martingale measure for e Y exists and coincides with the Esscher martingale measure for Y . The latter is provided by
where η * is the root of equation (4.18) . Finally, using the martingale property of Y (cf. [36, Remark 4] ), we deduce that
which in turn implies the desired result.
Therefore, using (4.15)-(4.16) and Proposition 4.3, the speculators' optimization problem can be written as
In other words, recalling (3.12) and (3.14) , the speculators' optimization problem has the representation
where the function u s (α, h s ) admits the explicit expression
otherwise. Remark 4.5. Let us also discuss for which Lévy processes conditions (NA ) and (FE) are satisfied. (NA ) is rather mild since it requires the existence of an equivalent martingale measure (EMM) under which the random variable X = u 2 , Z T has finite first moment. Explicit constructions of EMMs for Lévy processes are studied in Eberlein and Jacod [20] and in Cherny and Shiryaev [14] . (FE) is also standard in the literature related to exponential utility maximization and entropic hedging. Hubalek and Sgarra [36] provide explicit parameter regimes for this condition to be satisfied, which fit well with empirical data.
Remark 4.6. Condition (NA ) implies that the speculators' indifference price for the commodity is bounded from above. More precisely, the (buyer's) indifference price for a random payoff C T is defined as the solution p(C T ) of the equation
According to Delbaen et al. [17, §5.2] or Fujiwara and Miyahara [26, §4] , the indifference price of an agent with exponential utility and risk aversion equal to γ s admits the following representation
where Q * is the martingale measure minimizing the entropy with respect to P. With this at hand, (2.8) yields the assertion.
We conclude this subsection with a statement analogous to Proposition 3.2 for the speculators' side, thereby strengthening the results of Proposition 3.4. More specifically, we show that the speculators' optimization problem admits a maximizer for every α ∈ [0, π 0 ] and every forward price in the no-arbitrage interval, which is defined by Building on the above representation, it suffices to show that p(h s P T ) − h s F is concave, upper semicontinuous and coercive. Concavity is readily implied by (4.25), while upper semicontinuity follows from the fact that u s is upper semicontinuous; cf. Remark 4.4. As for coercivity, using again (4.25) we get that for every h s > 0
Moreover, it holds that
hence p(h s P T ) − h s F goes to −∞ as h s → +∞, for every F ∈ NA. The limit as h s → −∞ follows by similar argumentation and using the payoff −P T instead of P T , and the proof is completed. : Q ∈ M f } is not a singleton, meaning that the variate X determining the consumers demand is not a replicable payoff.
The equilibrium revisited
Finally, we can further strengthen the result on the existence of an equilibrium in the current setting, by showing that equilibrium forward prices belong to the no-arbitrage interval. Proof. In view of Theorem 3.5, we only need to show thatF ∈ NA. Assume, for instance, that
Taking into account the proof of Theorem 3.5 as well as representations (4.25) and (4.26), we get that
The last statement contradicts the fact thatĥ s +ĥ p = 0 andĥ p ∈ R.
Remark 4.10. Assumption (FE) guarantees that there exists an optimal trading strategy for the speculators and is necessary in deriving the explicit expression (4.24). However, it is not a necessary condition for the existence of an equilibrium.
Examples, numerical illustrations and discussion
In this final section, we consider two specific models for the evolution of the financial market and the consumers' demand. The first one is driven by correlated Brownian motions and the second one incorporates dependent jumps in addition. In both cases we derive semi-explicit expressions for the optimal storage policy and the optimal forward volume. The equilibrium prices are then computed numerically and we study the effect of the various parameters, in particular the risk aversion coefficients of both agents, in the formation of spot and forward prices.
A model driven by Brownian motion
In the first example, the dynamics of the variates X and Y determining the consumers demand and the financial market are driven by correlated Brownian motions. Specifically
where W 1 , W 2 are standard Brownian motions with correlation ρ ∈ [−1, 1]. Moreover, using (2.8), the mean and variance of the spot price are given by
The ensuing result provides an explicit expression for the optimal inventory policy and the optimal investment in the forward contract.
Proposition 5.1. Assuming the model dynamics provided by (5.1), the optimal strategy (α,ĥ p ) for the producers' problem is given bŷ
while the optimal positionĥ s for the speculators' problem equalŝ
Here, the constants d 1 , . . . , d 5 are provided by (A.5) andγ s = γ s (1 − ρ 2 ).
The proof of the preceding Proposition is postponed for Appendix A.
The equilibrium forward priceF will be derived endogenously via the clearing condition (2.12), where we should note thatα,ĥ p andĥ s all depend onF . Thereafter, the equilibrium spot price of the commodity at the initial time is provided by P 0 (F ) = φ 0 (π 0 ) +α (F ) m .
(5.5)
Figures 5.1, 5.2 and 5.4 exhibit how the storage amount, the forward volume, the spot price, the forward premium and the convenience yield at the equilibrium depend on the correlation between the consumers' demand and the financial market, as well as on the producers' and speculators' risk aversion coefficients; see also the discussion in subsection 5.3.
Remark 5.2. Let us consider the case α * = 0. Then, the optimal position for the producers simplifies toĥ
and the clearing condition (2.12) yields that the equilibrium forward price is provided bŷ
Remark 5.3. In case the commodities market is not 'financialized', that is, there does not exist a forward contract that the producers could use for hedging-hence, there are also no speculators in the market-the producers optimization problem takes the form
where d 1 , d 2 are given by (A.5). Therefore, the optimal storage strategy equalŝ 9) and the spot price of the commodity is P 0 (α) = φ 0 (π 0 ) +α m .
A jump-diffusion model
In the next example, the dynamics of the variates that determine the consumers' demand and the financial market are driven by a Lévy jump-diffusion process, where the Brownian motion represents the 'normal' market behavior while the jumps appear simultaneously and represent some 'shocks', e.g. news announcements, that affect both the financial asset price and the demand for the commodity. More precisely, the dynamics of the processes Y and X are described by
where the drift term equals b i =b i − λη i withb i , η i ∈ R and σ i ∈ R + , i = 1, 2. Furthermore, W 1 , W 2 are standard Brownian motions with correlation ρ, while N is a univariate Poisson process with intensity λ ∈ R + . Hence, the constants η 1 and η 2 represent the effect of a jump in the financial market and the demand for the commodity, respectively. Moreover, assumingb 2 = 0 as in the previous example, the expectation of X T equals zero and using (2.8) we get that
Observe that the presence of jumps, either negative or positive, increases the variance of the spot price P T relative to the Brownian motion example. The next result provides an expression for the optimal inventory policy and the optimal investment in the forward contract.
Proposition 5.4. Assuming the model dynamics provided by (5.10), the optimal strategyα,ĥ p for the producers' problem is provided byα = (α * ∨ 0) ∧ π 0 andĥ p = h p, * (α) where (α * , h p, * ) solve the system of equations Here d 1 , . . . , d 5 are given by (A.5) by replacing Var[P T ] with σ 2 2 T m 2 . The optimal investment for the speculators' problemĥ s is provided by the solution to the equation
13)
where η * is given by (A.31).
Similarly to the previous example, the equilibrium forward priceF is derived endogenously via the clearing condition (2.12) by noting again thatα,ĥ p andĥ s depend onF and the equilibrium spot price of the commodity at the initial time is again given by (5.5) . Therefore, in order to determine the equilibrium we need to solve equations (5.12) and (5.13) . To this end, we have used numerical techniques, and have subsequently examined the impact of jumps on equilibrium quantities; see Figure 5 .3 and the discussion in subsection 5.3.
Discussion of the results

Producers' risk aversion and spot/forward prices
We can use the results above to create several figures that illustrate the effect of the model parameters on the equilibrium quantities. We first examine the producers' side. The quantities that the producers have to consider are provided by w(α, h p ) in (2.1). We may split the terms into deterministic and stochastic ones. The deterministic part consists of the spot revenues from selling π 0 −α at the spot price P 0 , the expected future revenues from selling π T +α(1−ε) at the price E[P T ], and the expected payoff of the short position h p in forward contracts. The stochastic term stems from the randomness of the future price P T and equals [α(1 − ε) + h p + π T ]X/m. One can readily see that the deterministic term is decreasing with respect to α. However, the risk in the stochastic term is also reduced for decreasing storage amounts. Assuming that E[X] = 0, this risk is minimized when the quantity α(1 − ε) + h p + π T vanishes, that is, when all the future sales are hedged 20 . Hence, a large amount of the commodity in storage implies also a large position to be hedged and vice versa. Considering only the deterministic term, producers have no motivation to store their production. However, by storing part of their production now they are increasing the spot price of the commodity. In addition, because they are risk averse, in order to hedge their future risk exposure, they are willing to share some of their future revenues by taking a short position in the forward contract. Naturally, the higher the risk aversion the larger the short position in the forward contract (see the top-right of Figure 5 .1) and the higher the forward premium paid to the speculators (see the bottom-right of Figure 5 .1). Moreover, a larger position in forward contracts implies an increasing tendency for storage, thus higher risk aversion leads to increased storage amounts (see the top-left of Figure 5 .1). Summarizing, producers with higher risk aversion tend to store more of their production when they can hedge the risk of future sales, a result which is consistent with the theory of storage, and this increases the spot price of the commodity (see the bottom-left of Figure 5.1 ).
This result is further supported by the model without 'financialization' in the market, see Remark 5.3. There we observe that producers never store any of their production, irrespective of their risk aversion coefficient, since there does not exist a counterparty for hedging their risk exposure. Thus, spot prices are always lower compared to the model with financialization.
Let us also discuss the effect of jumps in the equilibrium quantities. Figure 5 .3 illustrates the effect of a possible side shock in the consumers' demand stemming from a jump. This jump not only increases the risk of the future price but it is also unhedgeable, since it is independent from the evolution of the stock market (we have assumed η 1 = 0). Therefore, the forward premium paid to the speculators is higher irrespective of the sign of the jump (see the right part of Figure 5.3) . On the other hand, when the future price is riskier, recalling the discussion above, we conclude that the more risk averse the producers are the more they increase the amount they store and hence they also increase the spot price of the commodity (see the left part of Figure 5 .3). In addition, note that the sign of the jump makes little difference in the equilibrium quantities (if the expectation of the future demand shock is kept equal to zero).
The effect of the producers' risk aversion on market equilibrium can be used to examine how the number of producers affects the equilibrium commodity prices. In the present framework of CARA preferences, the parameter 1/γ p measures the producers' aggregate risk tolerance. Therefore, if the number of producers increases, the parameter γ p decreases and the analysis above implies that equilibrium spot prices are lower, as expected.
Speculators' risk aversion and spot/forward prices
Let us now examine the speculators' side. When they become more risk averse, they are less willing to undertake the risk of a forward position. This is illustrated in Figure 5.2 (top-right) , where the percentageĥ/(π T +α) (i.e. the percentage of forward contracts with respect to the total supply at time T ) is plotted. Also, as the theory of normal backwardation states, more risk averse speculators would require higher forward premium to enter into the forward contract. This premium is usually measured by the fraction (E[P T ] −F )/F which is plotted in Figure  5 .2 (bottom-right). On the other hand, a higher forward premium implies that hedging is more expensive for the producers, hence they intend to supply more in the spot market and store less; note that the optimal storage amount even equals zero in some cases as the top-left of Figure  5 .2 shows). Summarizing, when speculators are more risk averse they invest less in forward contracts, which reduces the amount that producers can use for hedging; thus, producers offer more on the spot market, rendering equilibrium spot prices lower (see the bottom-left of Figure  5 .2).
Turning our attention to the effect of the correlation between the consumers' demand and the financial markets' return, we note that the equilibrium quantities mainly depend on the square of ρ; this is basically because speculators can go both long and short in the stock market. When ρ 2 increases, the effective risk aversion of the speculators', which isγ s = γ s (1 − ρ 2 ), decreases. Therefore, an increase of ρ 2 is eventually equivalent to a decrease of γ s . This is expected because when the financial and the commodity markets are correlated, the speculators can partially hedge the risk they undertake on a forward commodity contract by adjusting their investment strategy in the stock market accordingly. Hence, they become more risk tolerant. The dependence of the equilibrium quantities on the correlation coefficient ρ is illustrated in Figure 5 
The effect of the speculators' risk aversion on market equilibrium can be used to examine how the number of speculators affects the equilibrium commodity prices. In the present framework of CARA preferences, the parameter 1/γ s measures the speculators' aggregate risk tolerance.
Hence, if the number of speculators increases, the parameter γ s considered in the above analysis decreases. As we have seen, the latter implies among other things higher equilibrium spot prices. This theoretical result is consistent with the observed comovement of the amounts invested in the commodity forward contracts and the commodity spot prices (see the related discussion in the introduction).
Convenience yield and correlation
As mentioned in the introduction, the convenience yield is a measure of the implicit benefit that inventory holders receive. Positivity of the convenience yield is consistent with the theory of storage. In our model, the convenience yield denoted by y solves the equation
see e.g. [1] . The relation of the yield with respect to the risk aversion coefficients of the producers and the speculators is illustrated in Figure 5 .4. As expected, y is increasing with respect to both risk aversion coefficients. The relation for the producers' side follows readily from Figure 5.1, since higher producers' risk aversion implies higher spot equilibrium price and higher forward premium (and also lower equilibrium forward price). Similarly, as the risk tolerance of the speculators decreases, the cost of hedging increases, which makes producers sell more at the spot rather than storing and selling at a future date (see, in particular, the bottom-right of Figure  5 .2). The relation of the yield with respect to the correlation coefficient is more involved. When ρ 2 increases, there are two effects of opposite directions on the convenience yield. The first is negative and stems from the decrease of the speculators' effective risk aversion, while the second is positive and comes from the corresponding increase of the spot price (see the bottom-left of Figure 5 .1). The final outcome depends on the level of the risk aversions. In particular, when producers' are sufficiently risk averse (tolerant), y is decreasing (increasing) in ρ 2 . Note also that the steep increase of the convenience yield when ρ approaches zero (right graph on Figure  5 .4) occurs when the storage is zero (compare with the top-left of Figure 5 .2), since in this case only the negative effect of ρ 2 in the convenience yield occurs (when the storage is zero, the spot price does not increase).
A. Proofs of Section 5
Proof (Proof of Proposition 5.1). The model with dynamics (5.1) fits in the framework of Section 4 by considering a 2-dimensional Brownian motion Z whose characteristic triplet has the form 
The first order conditions yield the following solutions and the maximizer is determined by the first order conditions, leading to (5.13) .
